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I. INTRODUCTION 
Delaware inhabits a competitive landscape that includes, but is not 
limited to, corporate law.  Like other small jurisdictions active in cross-
border corporate and financial services, Delaware has become widely 
associated with a particular area of specialization, providing de facto U.S. 
corporate law for large, publicly traded companies.  However, the economic 
development imperatives prompting this have also led Delaware to explore 
opportunities in related though distinct fields that build upon this platform, 
effectively leveraging their corporate law advantage to expand and diversify 
the state’s revenue streams.  This Article assesses Delaware’s competitive 
position amidst this broader landscape. 
Part II provides an overview of prevailing accounts of U.S. corporate 
charter competition, which generally conclude that Delaware faces quite 
limited competition from other states.1  When the frame of reference is 
limited to domestic corporate charter competition, only federal preemption 
would appear to pose a substantial threat to Delaware’s dominance.  In 
response to these prevailing accounts, this Part suggests that such a narrow 
view of the competitive landscape misses important dynamics that could 
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 1. See infra Part II. 
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affect Delaware’s position moving forward.  Minimally, these include the 
emergence of competitors abroad that challenge Delaware’s corporate 
dominance on multiple fronts—both internationally and with respect to 
chartering of large companies based in the United States. 
Part III pushes the analysis further by assessing Delaware’s broader 
competitive landscape beyond corporate law.2  This Part reframes the matter 
by reference to underlying economic development imperatives, which are 
particularly pressing for smaller, resource-constrained jurisdictions like 
Delaware.  It then examines Delaware’s efforts to leverage corporate law—
that is, to build on Delaware’s corporate law advantage by expanding into 
related though distinct fields that build upon that preexisting platform, 
including aspects of financial services and insurance where chartering and 
innovative entity structures loom large. 
Part IV concludes, observing that this broader framing—including 
cross-border and extra-corporate dynamics—reveals a more complex 
competitive landscape than prevailing accounts can accommodate.3  Overall, 
Delaware faces real competition from a range of domestic and foreign 
jurisdictions that have grappled with similar economic development 
challenges through similar strategies, producing global competitive 
dynamics that may substantially impact Delaware’s long-term prospects. 
II. DELAWARE’S CORPORATE COMPETITION 
Prevailing accounts of U.S. corporate charter competition generally 
describe Delaware’s position as essentially unassailable, save only the 
(remote) possibility of substantial federal preemption.  This Part provides a 
brief overview of such accounts and assesses them amidst a broader 
competitive landscape—notably, the rise of foreign competitors challenging 
Delaware in both international and domestic contexts. 
A. Prevailing Accounts 
As a constitutional matter, corporate law in the United States has 
traditionally been left to the states themselves.4  Potential for domestic charter 
competition, then, arises from the internal affairs doctrine, a choice-of-law 
 
 2. See infra Part III. 
 3. See infra Part IV. 
 4. See U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the 
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the 
people.”).  While James Madison proposed to the Constitutional Convention that Congress be given 
broad incorporation powers, his proposal was not adopted.  See WILLIAM T. ALLEN & REINIER 
KRAAKMAN, COMMENTARIES AND CASES ON THE LAW OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATION 79 n.6 (5th 
ed. 2016); Christopher M. Bruner, What is the Domain of Corporate Law? 29–30 (Univ. of Ga. Sch. 
of L. Rsch. Paper Series No. 2019-04, 2019), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3308611. 
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rule under which a corporation’s internal affairs are generally governed by 
the law of the state of incorporation, regardless of where the corporation is 
headquartered or predominately operates.5  In the corporate law literature, 
these dynamics have long been assessed by reference to whether the resulting 
competition to attract incorporations is likely to result in a race to the bottom, 
with states eliminating beneficial regulation to lower compliance costs, or a 
race to the top, with states favoring regulation that efficiently balances the 
interests of various corporate constituencies.6 
Over time, these conflicting positions have only ossified through their 
association with conflicting views on the law-and-economics-inspired 
“nexus of contracts” conception of the corporation.  Proponents of this 
conception generally assume a high level of market efficiency and minimal 
potential for harmful externalities, in which light charter competition appears 
inherently efficient because it reflects market preferences.7  Opponents of the 
nexus conception, meanwhile, reject those assumptions and correlatively 
argue that charter competition promotes socially harmful outcomes because 
it enables corporations to opt into laws that favor corporate insiders at the 
expense of outsiders who do not participate in incorporation decisions, and 
whose interests will accordingly be disregarded by states competing for 
corporate charters.8 
Whatever the merits of these competing policy positions may be,9 
empirical studies have concluded that Delaware faces little meaningful 
competition among U.S. states when it comes to attracting incorporations 
 
 5. See REST. (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 302(2), 304 (1971).  See also CTS Corp. v. 
Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 89 (1987); Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 479 
(1977); ERIN A. O’HARA & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE LAW MARKET 107–31 (2009). 
 6. Compare William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 
83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974) (characterizing Delaware as “contributing to the deterioration of 
corporation standards”) with Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the 
Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251 (1977) (arguing that state charter competition 
“should tend toward optimality so far as the shareholder’s relationship to the corporation is 
concerned”). 
 7. See, e.g., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
CORPORATE LAW 35–39, 212–18 (1991). 
 8. See, e.g., KENT GREENFIELD, THE FAILURE OF CORPORATE LAW: FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS 
AND PROGRESSIVE POSSIBILITIES 114–19 (2006). 
 9. In prior work, I tend toward the latter view, rejecting highly shareholder-centric approaches 
to corporate law on both positive and normative grounds.  See generally CHRISTOPHER M. BRUNER, 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE COMMON-LAW WORLD: THE POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF 
SHAREHOLDER POWER (2013); see also Beate Sjåfjell & Christopher M. Bruner, Corporations and 
Sustainability, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE LAW, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
AND SUSTAINABILITY 3 (Beate Sjåfjell & Christopher M. Bruner eds., 2019); Christopher M. Bruner 
& Beate Sjåfjell, Corporate Law, Corporate Governance and the Pursuit of Sustainability, in THE 
CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE LAW, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND SUSTAINABILITY, 
supra, at 713.  
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from companies based elsewhere.10  At the interstate level, Delaware at most 
faces competitive pressure to maintain rules appealing to institutional 
investors in large public companies,11 and “defensive” competition from 
other states that aim to keep locally headquartered companies incorporated 
there.12  Beyond this, Delaware’s only real domestic competition for 
corporate charters would appear to be the federal government, insofar as the 
Commerce Clause gives Congress authority to federalize corporate law for 
companies operating in interstate commerce.13  To date, Congress has 
exercised this authority only sporadically and in response to crises, 
substantially leaving the core of corporate governance in public companies 
to Delaware.14  Over 1 million business entities “have made Delaware their 
legal home,”15 and this includes “more than two thirds of the Fortune 500 and 
80 percent of all firms that go public.”16 
While the early days of U.S. charter competition in the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries do bear the hallmarks of a regulatory race to the 
bottom—with New Jersey attracting incorporations from New York through 
adoption of a permissive corporate statute, and Delaware taking over when 
New Jersey later cracked down under then-Governor Woodrow Wilson17—
Delaware now has a more favorable story to tell about its attractions as a 
 
 10. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Vigorous Race or Leisurely Walk: 
Reconsidering the Competition over Corporate Charters, 112 YALE L.J. 553, 578 (2002); Robert 
Daines, The Incorporation Choices of IPO Firms, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1559, 1570-74 (2002); Marcel 
Kahan & Ehud Kamar, The Myth of State Competition in Corporate Law, 55 STAN. L. REV. 679, 
687 (2002). 
 11. See Ofer Eldar & Lorenzo Magnolfi, Regulatory Competition and the Market for Corporate 
Law, 12 AM. ECON. J.: MICROECONOMICS 60, 81–82 (2020) (finding that “although Delaware has 
substantial market power, if it adopted laws that signal to the market that it does not view takeovers 
favorably, it would lose significant market share”).  
 12. See Roberta Romano, The States as a Laboratory: Legal Innovation and State Competition 
for Corporate Charters, 23 YALE J. ON REG. 209, 214 (2006). 
 13. See U.S. CONST. art. I § 8, cl. 3 (giving Congress power to “regulate Commerce . . . among 
the several States”).  For additional background, see Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 117 
HARV. L. REV. 588 (2003); Mark J. Roe, Delaware and Washington as Corporate Lawmakers, 34 
DEL. J. CORP. L. 1 (2009).  Congress derives further incorporation powers from the Necessary and 
Proper clause.  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (granting Congress power “To make all Laws 
which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other 
Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States”); McCulloch v. 
Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 406–09, 422–25 (1819) (holding that the federal government 
could incorporate a national bank as “a convenient, a useful, and essential instrument in the 
prosecution of its fiscal operations”). 
 14. BRUNER, supra note 9, at 37–38, 276–77. 
 15. Why Businesses Choose Delaware, DELAWARE.GOV, https://corplaw.delaware.gov/why-
businesses-choose-delaware/ (last visited July 31, 2020). 
 16. Annual Report Statistics, DEL. DIV. OF CORPS. (2018), 
https://corpfiles.delaware.gov/Annual-Reports/Division-of-Corporations-2018-Annual-Report.pdf. 
 17. See CHRISTOPHER M. BRUNER, RE-IMAGINING OFFSHORE FINANCE: MARKET-DOMINANT 
SMALL JURISDICTIONS IN A GLOBALIZING FINANCIAL WORLD 179–81 (2016). 
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jurisdiction of incorporation for U.S. public companies.  Today, Delaware 
fairly cites the benefits of “an enabling statute intended to permit 
corporations and their shareholders the maximum flexibility in ordering their 
affairs,” a legislature that “gives a high priority to corporation law matters,” 
expert judges producing considerable corporate case law, and a service-
oriented and “user-friendly” Division of Corporations.18  From a competitive 
perspective, a sparse statute and heavy reliance on case-by-case judicial 
application of abstract fiduciary concepts such as loyalty, care, and good faith 
generates a body of corporate law that is essentially “unique and not easily 
replicated” elsewhere.19  
B. International Competition in Corporate Law 
The foregoing accounts generally suggest that Delaware now enjoys 
advantages in the market for corporate charters that would be difficult for 
domestic competitors to overcome to any meaningful degree.  It is critical to 
observe, however, that these accounts focus solely on the domestic picture.  
These matters take on a different cast when one recalls that capital is 
increasingly mobile, fueling global regulatory competition in numerous areas 
of corporate and financial services.20  This requires that some account be 
taken of where Delaware sits relative to competition from abroad. 
As a threshold matter, Delaware officials themselves are well aware of 
these dynamics, and actively pursue international incorporations business.  In 
a marketing piece aptly titled “Beyond the Borders,” the Delaware Division 
of Corporations argues that, for the same reasons they appeal to domestic 
entities, “Delaware’s business statutes are also attractive to foreign 
businesses seeking a home for their U.S. business ventures.”21  At the same 
time, the attractions of Delaware business entities have not gone unnoticed 
internationally, and in this context Delaware faces considerable competition 
from a range of jurisdictions—notably various British Overseas Territories 
such as Bermuda, the British Virgin Islands, and the Cayman Islands, another 
 
 18. LEWIS S. BLACK, JR., WHY CORPORATIONS CHOOSE DELAWARE 2–10 (2007) (pamphlet 
printed and distributed by the Delaware Division of Corporations); see also WILLIAM W. BOYER & 
EDWARD C. RATLEDGE, DELAWARE POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT 18–20 (2009); BRUNER, supra 
note 17, at 181–83. 
 19. Omari Scott Simmons, Delaware’s Global Threat, 41 J. CORP. L. 217, 247 (2015).  For 
discussion of the complex and idiosyncratic approaches to these concepts that have resulted, see 
generally Christopher M. Bruner, Good Faith, State of Mind, and the Outer Boundaries of Director 
Liability in Corporate Law, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1131 (2006); Christopher M. Bruner, Is the 
Corporate Director’s Duty of Care a “Fiduciary” Duty? Does It Matter?, 48 WAKE FOREST L. 
REV. 1027 (2013). 
 20. See BRUNER, supra note 17, at 30–38.  
 21. Beyond the Borders: Delaware’s Benefits for International Business, DELAWARE.GOV, 
https://corplaw.delaware.gov/delawares-benefits-international-business/ (last visited Aug. 2, 2020). 
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category of sub-sovereign jurisdictions active in global corporate and 
financial services.22 
These market dynamics complicate the more benign account of 
Delaware’s dominance cited above.  Having itself pursued what (from the 
U.S. vantage point) amounts to “offshore” incorporations business, Delaware 
has exposed itself to accusations of purveying opaque shell companies 
susceptible to money laundering, tax evasion, and other criminal activities—
a characterization fueled by Delaware’s long-standing refusal to collect 
beneficial ownership information at the formation stage for corporations and 
limited liability companies,23 although Delaware has recently voiced support 
for a federal-level regime and taken other steps to prevent abuses.24 
At the same time, the assumption that other jurisdictions cannot 
effectively replicate the attractive features of Delaware’s system for 
resolution of corporate disputes may be too simplistic.  As Omari Simmons 
has observed, several jurisdictions around the world, “borrowing in part from 
Delaware’s model, have invested in their corporate adjudicative capabilities 
to enhance their reputations for adjudicating business-related disputes.”25  He 
adds that, in terms of global competition, “the prospect of firms eschewing 
national courts for alternative dispute resolution is perhaps one of the greatest 
potential threats to Delaware’s dominance,” particularly to the degree that 
“international arbitration is favored among general counsels.”26  In this light, 
“international arbitration hubs, such as London and emerging venues like 
Singapore, are a potential long-term threat to Delaware’s dominance.”27 
 
 22. The British Virgin Islands represents the main incorporations competitor internationally.  
See BRUNER, supra note 17, at 37, 234. 
 23. See BRUNER, supra note 17, at 184–87, 228–30; Joachim Bartels, Discreet Delaware: Why 
Corporate Secrecy and Money Laundering Have Thrived in the US, BUS. INFO. INDUS. ASS’N (Apr. 
6, 2019), https://www.biia.com/discreet-delaware-why-corporate-secrecy-and-money-laundering-
have-thrived-in-the-us.  For the little information required to form a Delaware corporation or limited 
liability company, see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(a); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-201(a) (neither 
requiring beneficial ownership information).   
 24. See, e.g., Annual Report Statistics, supra note 16 (citing efforts to “deny access to those 
who attempt to use Delaware entities for nefarious purposes,” including adopting “Know Your 
Customer” regulations and advocating “federal action to make beneficial ownership information 
available to law enforcement”); Facts and Myths, DELAWARE.GOV, 
https://corplaw.delaware.gov/facts-and-myths/ (last visited Aug. 2, 2020) (citing, in response to 
charges of providing “anonymity and secrecy,” Delaware’s ban on bearer shares).  See also 
Delaware Coalition for Open Government, Opinion: More Could Be Done in Delaware to Prevent 
Abuse of LLCs, DEL. ONLINE, Mar. 7, 2019, 
https://www.delawareonline.com/story/opinion/2019/03/07/delawares-corporate-law-needs-fresh-
set-eyes-prevent-misuse/3093468002/.  
 25. Simmons, supra note 19, at 244. 
 26. Id. at 255. 
 27. Id. at 256; see also William J. Moon, Delaware’s New Competition, 114 NW. U. L. REV. 
1403 (2020).  
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Hitting closer to home, foreign jurisdictions are even competing to 
provide charters—and accordingly, corporate law—for large U.S.-listed 
companies, Delaware’s bread and butter.  Indeed, William Moon has found 
that “foreign nations are juridical homes to over 14% of large publicly traded 
corporations listed in American securities markets.”28  As he observes, this 
could exert meaningful pressure on aspects of substantive corporate law 
regarded as mandatory in Delaware.29  There is of course a double irony here: 
insofar as Delaware itself markets an “enabling” approach to corporate law, 
these jurisdictions might be said to have out-Delawared Delaware, and 
insofar as this phenomenon arises from U.S. courts’ application of the 
internal affairs doctrine to entities incorporated abroad, these jurisdictions 
might be said to have hoisted Delaware on its own petard.30  Significantly, 
British Overseas Territories once again predominate in this space—notably, 
Bermuda, the British Virgin Islands, and the Cayman Islands—and these 
jurisdictions have actively sought “to differentiate their corporate law from 
that of Delaware” in order to compete more effectively for chartering 
business among U.S.-listed companies.31 
III. DELAWARE’S BROADER COMPETITIVE LANDSCAPE 
The global dynamics discussed in Part II suggest that, even when the 
frame of reference is limited to corporate law, prevailing accounts of charter 
competition and Delaware’s dominance within that marketplace are over-
simplified.  This Part takes the analysis further by assessing the broader 
competitive landscape that Delaware encounters beyond corporate law, 
reframing the matter by reference to underlying economic development 
imperatives and examining Delaware’s efforts to leverage its corporate law 
advantage in other areas.  These include aspects of financial services and 
insurance where corporate chartering and innovative entity structures loom 
large—the most consequential examples being credit card-issuing banks and 
captive insurance companies.32  Each represents a distinct, though related, 
“law market,”33 and understanding them is critical to a full understanding of 
Delaware’s competitive position.   
 
 28. Moon, supra note 27, at 1407.  
 29. See id. at 1445–1453 (discussing how other jurisdictions have placed limitations on 
derivative suits and inspection of books and records, while permitting greater capacity to reduce 
fiduciary duty constraints). 
 30. Cf. id. at 1420–21, 1444.   
 31. See id. at 1423–29.  
 32. Blockchain-based businesses may prove to be another area where Delaware seeks to 
leverage the preexisting corporate law advantage.  See Christopher M. Bruner, Distributed Ledgers, 
Artificial Intelligence and the Purpose of the Corporation, 79 CAMBRIDGE L.J. (forthcoming 2020) 
(discussing the Delaware Blockchain Initiative).  
 33. On this concept, see O’HARA & RIBSTEIN, supra note 5, at 3.  
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A. The Economic Development Imperative 
Small, resource-constrained jurisdictions face unique economic 
development challenges that render the development of high-value-added 
services particularly attractive. Those, like Delaware, that have been 
particularly successful in cross-border corporate and financial services tend 
to have similar characteristics and pursue similar strategies.  I have elsewhere 
termed them “market-dominant small jurisdictions” (“MDSJs”), and 
developed an ideal type to summarize their consequential features.  MDSJs 
(1) “are small and poorly endowed with natural resources, limiting their 
economic-development options”; (2) “possess legislative autonomy” (though 
not necessarily full sovereignty); (3) “are culturally proximate to multiple 
economic powers, and favorably situated geographically vis-à-vis those 
powers”; (4) “heavily invest in human capital, professional networks, and 
related institutional structures”; and (5) “consciously balance close 
collaboration with and robust oversight of the financial professional 
community, seeking at once to convey flexibility, stability, and credibility.”34 
A number of significant players in cross-border corporate and financial 
services broadly reflect these characteristics and strategies, Delaware 
included.35  Briefly, Delaware (1) is among the very smallest U.S. states in 
both land area and population; (2) possesses substantial legislative autonomy 
(even as a sub-sovereign) in corporate law and, as we will see, in lucrative 
related fields; (3) is favorably positioned between, and connected with, the 
finance capital (New York) and the political capital (Washington, D.C.); (4) 
has heavily invested in various forms of corporate and financial services, in 
addition to development of robust professional networks (for example, the 
Corporation Law Section of the Delaware Bar Association) and related 
institutional structures—activities facilitated by Delaware’s small size and 
the relative proximity of relevant public and private actors; and (5) has 
consciously cultivated balanced regulation in an effort to satisfice various 
relevant constituencies—including the principal corporate governance actors 
(management and shareholders), the main political parties (Delaware being 
famously centrist), and external regulatory actors who could disrupt 
Delaware’s market if substantial problems were to arise (i.e. Congress).36 
The upshot of Delaware’s approach to economic development has been 
its extraordinary reliance on servicing large corporations.  While this might 
be measured in various ways, there is no gainsaying the significance of 
business entity registration for Delaware from an economic development 
 
 34. BRUNER, supra note 17, at 41–49 (emphasis removed).   
 35. See id. chs. 4–9 (providing case studies through this lens including Bermuda, Dubai, 
Singapore, Hong Kong, Switzerland, and Delaware).   
 36. See id. at 175–87; see also BOYER & RATLEDGE, supra note 18, at 26–28. 
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perspective.  The Division of Corporations reports that its collections have 
accounted for approximately one-quarter of Delaware general fund revenues 
over recent years,37 and the trend in total collections slopes upward.38  Even 
this, however, understates Delaware’s dependence on incorporation-related 
revenue sources.  While personal income taxes were the largest single 
revenue source for Delaware in 2014 ($1.14 billion), corporate franchise 
taxes ($776.7 million) and abandoned property ($566.5 million) together 
exceeded the state’s personal income tax revenues.39  This is significant 
because, as an additional “financial benefit of Delaware’s corporate 
franchise, abandoned property includes the unredeemed value of gift cards, 
uncashed corporate checks, business-to-business credits, and dormant stock 
accounts.  If the company is incorporated in Delaware, the money comes 
here.”40  Taking into account corporate income taxes as well, these direct 
sources of corporation-related revenues accounted for almost 40% of 
Delaware’s general fund revenues in 2014.41  As the Delaware Business 
Roundtable summed it up in an analysis of Delaware’s budget, “the state has 
been successful in ‘exporting’ its revenue burden through the large franchise 
fee and abandoned property collections, from mostly out-of-state 
businesses.”42   
To be sure, this reflects adoption of a “uniquely aggressive abandoned 
property program” to shore up the budget in the wake of the financial crisis, 
generating abnormal revenues that could not be sustained indefinitely.43  It 
also bears emphasizing, however, that the corporate chartering business made 
this short-term opportunity uniquely available to Delaware in the first place, 
and that the foregoing figures do not account for further state revenues that 
are indirectly attributable to incorporations—for example, income taxes paid 
by professionals employed to service Delaware corporations in various 
capacities.44 
 
 37. See BRUNER, supra note 17, at 176–77. 
 38. See Annual Report Statistics, supra note 16. 
 39. See Jonathan Starkey, Delaware Taxes: Top 5 Sources of State Revenue, DEL. ONLINE (May 
19, 2014), http://delonline.us/1ne9ba0. 
 40. Id. 
 41. See Delaware Business Roundtable, Delaware’s Structural Budget Problem: Causes, 
Potential Solutions, and Policy Tradeoffs (2015), https://www.dbrt.org/state-finances-study 
(reporting that the franchise tax accounted for 23%, abandoned property for 13%, and the corporate 
income tax for 3%). 
 42. Id.  See also BOYER & RATLEDGE, supra note 18, at 138–39 (similarly calculating that 
“32.3 percent of all 2007 revenue of Delaware’s state government came from businesses that for the 
most part were not doing business in Delaware”). 
 43. See Delaware Business Roundtable, supra note 41 (describing retroactive collections and 
forecasting a drop in such revenues moving forward). 
 44. Cf. BOYER & RATLEDGE, supra note 18, at 112 (observing that, in addition to corporate 
franchise taxes, Delaware’s economy benefits from “the scale and productivity of the entire legal 
industry in Delaware – the employment generated, wages paid, and services consumed”); Starkey, 
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The foregoing data underscore both how successful Delaware has been 
at cultivating incorporation-related revenue sources and how extraordinarily 
dependent Delaware has become on revenues that trace back to that single 
source.  In this light, it is hardly surprising that Delaware would be keen to 
diversify—including by expanding into new areas where the preexisting 
corporate law foundation might give Delaware a leg up.  Delaware’s 
“Comprehensive Economic Development Strategy” recognizes that 
“Delaware has long been noted for its pro-business climate” but that 
“competition is now global,”45 and sets out a goal to “expand long-term 
economic growth through focused recruitment of businesses complementary 
to Delaware’s core business sectors,” including “financial services.”46 
B. Leveraging Corporate Law 
The economic development imperatives described above have led 
Delaware to aggressively pursue opportunities to leverage its corporate law 
advantage in other areas.  These include aspects of financial services and 
insurance where corporate chartering and innovative entity structures loom 
large—notably, credit card-issuing banks and captive insurance companies.  
In these contexts, however, Delaware has typically found itself following the 
lead of other jurisdictions that had earlier ventured into such areas in order to 
stake out fields of cross-border corporate and financial specialization of their 
own, for largely similar reasons. 
While there is a clear logic in Delaware’s effort to build upon its 
preexisting corporate law foundation in each of these areas, Delaware’s 
competition in these distinct fields complicates the prevailing accounts 
described above in multiple respects.  These additional fields of competition 
reflect a concerted effort to branch out beyond corporate law; they place 
Delaware in the less familiar, and perhaps uncomfortable, posture of being a 
follower rather than a market leader; and they reveal a larger and more 
complex competitive landscape for cross-border corporate and financial 
services where Delaware does indeed face meaningful competition, both 
domestically and abroad. 
1. Credit Cards 
In addition to its corporate franchise—and, in fact, as an extension of 
it—Delaware has achieved substantial successes as a jurisdiction of 
 
supra note 39 (observing that “personal income taxes remain the single largest source of state tax 
revenue” in Delaware). 
 45. DEL. ECON. DEV. OFF., COMPREHENSIVE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY 22 (Dec. 
20, 2014),  https://business.delaware.gov/wp-content/uploads/sites/118/2017/09/CEDS_Final
Revised12-20-2014.pdf. 
 46. Id. at 3, 30 (emphasis removed). 
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incorporation for credit card-issuing banks.  Indeed, “half of the nation’s 
credit cards originate in Delaware, and about 48,000 state residents are 
employed in the financial services industry, roughly one-tenth of the entire 
workforce.”47  As in the corporate franchise context generally, the geographic 
imbalance is apparent, as Delaware credit card issuers “represent about half 
of the U.S. credit card market” yet “Delaware residents account for only 0.3% 
of the U.S. population.”48  From an economic development perspective, both 
the general incorporation business and the specific effort to attract credit 
card-issuing banks reflect the same underlying drivers and capitalize on the 
same sorts of features discussed above.49  The results have been similarly 
impressive for Delaware.  William Boyer and Edward Ratledge, a political 
scientist and an economist, respectively, conclude that Delaware’s efforts to 
cultivate credit card business have proven “as important historically for 
Delaware’s economy as Delaware’s Chancery Court, the general 
incorporation laws, and even the influence of the DuPont Company itself,” 
notably due to the employment impacts of credit card operations.50  Perhaps 
inevitably, credit card-issuing banks have become a correlatively significant 
force in Delaware politics.51 
One might imagine all of this arising as a straightforward and direct 
extension of Delaware’s general dominance in the market for corporate 
charters.  As we will see, the two domains are closely related.  Yet, the story 
is in fact more complicated and involves significant, ongoing competition 
with other states.  Indeed, in a manner not unlike the early experience with 
incorporations, where Delaware took a leaf from New Jersey’s statute book, 
the relevant history for credit cards begins elsewhere—in this instance, South 
Dakota.  South Dakota pioneered a new form of charter competition 
fundamentally akin to that for corporations generally—only here, the core 
competitive drivers have been the perceived attractiveness of banking 
regulations related to credit card issuance. 
 
 47. David Dayen, Tom Carper’s 40-Year Record of Defending Banks Is Being Challenged by 
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https://www.forbes.com/sites/clairetsosie/2017/04/14/why-so-many-credit-cards-are-from-
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 49. See Delaware Business Roundtable, supra note 41, at 19 (analogizing between Delaware’s 
approach to corporate law and its approach to financial services, and “credit card operations” 
specifically). 
 50. BOYER & RATLEDGE, supra note 18, at 21–22; see also DEL. ECON. DEV. OFF., supra note 
45, at 10–11, 14, 43. 
 51. See BOYER & RATLEDGE, supra note 18, at 64–65; Dayen, supra note 47; Tim Murphy, 
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Under Section 85 of the National Bank Act, a national bank may charge 
“interest at the rate allowed by the laws of the State . . . where the bank is 
located.”52  This places great weight on how the location of a bank is legally 
determined.  In 1978, the U.S. Supreme Court decided in Marquette National 
Bank of Minneapolis v. First of Omaha Service Corporation53 that, for 
purposes of Section 85, a bank is located “in the State named in its 
organization certificate.”54  Consequently, as the Court candidly 
acknowledged, when a bank issues a credit card across state lines, “the 
interest rates of one State are ‘exported’ into another.”55  The Court well 
understood that this might “significantly impair the ability of States to enact 
effective usury laws,” and invited those unhappy with this outcome to express 
their views to Congress.56  The Court’s broad interpretation of Section 85’s 
other critical term, “interest,” would subsequently expand the reach of a 
bank’s capacity to “export” favorable laws from one state to another to 
include various bank-imposed fees as well.57 
The potential for bank chartering competition created by the Supreme 
Court’s Marquette holding was amplified, as a practical matter, by the 
inherent “mobility of credit cards.”58  This opened a potential national 
banking market at a time when New Deal-era regulations otherwise 
fragmented the banking industry along state lines,59 and when market 
conditions were otherwise creating substantial financial challenges for banks.  
Rampant inflation in the 1970s had driven banks’ cost of funds—i.e. the 
interest paid to depositors—above what the banks could in turn charge for 
loans under state usury laws.60  New York’s limits were particularly 
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restrictive, imposing interest rate ceilings while at the same time prohibiting 
banks from charging fees to offset costs of credit card administration.61 
Large banks with global operations already understood from the 
international context that capital mobility permits regulatory arbitrage,62 and 
the Marquette decision led them to reconsider their domestic operations 
through this lens—Citibank being the first mover.  New York had refused to 
raise its usury limit, so in early 1980 Citibank decided to move its credit card 
operations to a more accommodating jurisdiction.  Citibank developed a 
shortlist of states with high usury limits, no major competitors already there, 
and legislatures in session—criteria that yielded two possibilities: Missouri 
and South Dakota.63  Under the Bank Holding Company Act, Citibank 
required an affirmative invitation from a would-be host state, and Missouri 
balked due to opposition from local bankers who feared such a large potential 
competitor.64  South Dakota, on the other hand—a state in such dire economic 
straits that they had already decided to scrap usury limits to promote the flow 
of credit—proved more accommodating and extended an invitation to 
Citibank in exchange for a jobs guarantee.65 
By any measure, this proved to be a phenomenally successful economic 
development initiative for South Dakota.  The initial 1980 deal with Citibank 
envisioned 400 jobs,66 yet Citibank would ultimately become one of the 
state’s most significant private employers.67  As of 2017, there were “20,000 
jobs in financial services in Sioux Falls, South Dakota,”68 and it is critical to 
bear in mind the outsized impact such job figures have there.  Like Delaware, 
South Dakota is one of the least populous states in the country, meaning that 
this number of jobs has far greater impact, from an economic development 
perspective, than the same number of jobs would have in a much larger 
jurisdiction like New York.69  According to the South Dakota Governor’s 
Office of Economic Development, financial services was “the No. 1 industry 
in South Dakota, accounting for more than 15% of our economy” in 2015, 
and the state had “one of the highest concentrations of GDP attributable to 
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the finance industry in the nation, surpassed only by Delaware” (15.5% 
versus 29.2%).70  South Dakota also ranked first in bank assets in 2015, with 
holdings of $2.83 trillion.71  Naturally, this all suggests that big banks have 
substantial political and economic clout in South Dakota, and the State 
clearly aims to maintain a competitive business and tax climate relative to 
other states in order to attract and retain financial services providers.72 
It is hardly surprising that Delaware, observing South Dakota’s success 
in a closely related field, would perceive an opportunity for itself.  Indeed, 
Delaware was clued into the foregoing developments quite early because, as 
it happened, Delaware was effectively in the room when South Dakota and 
Citibank struck their initial deal in 1980.  As South Dakota’s then-Governor 
Bill Janklow would later recall in a 2004 interview: 
… On Citibank’s board of directors were all these corporate 
titans, and one of them was Irving Shapiro.  Irving Shapiro was 
the CEO of DuPont Company, headquartered in Delaware.  And 
Shapiro, when we were doing our Citibank deal, went back to 
Delaware and said to Pete du Pont, who was then the governor of 
Delaware: “Pete, this is crazy.  Delaware has got this long history 
of being kind of the corporate locus for America.  This financial 
services industry, it’s all going to go to South Dakota.  Let’s get 
the law changed in Delaware.”  And so Delaware actually 
changed their law in the following year.73 
That Delaware could effectively leverage its preexisting corporate 
platform to expand and diversify through this related form of bank charter 
competition was lost on no one, and other banks similarly seeking a new 
home for their credit card operations were quick to move.  Then-Governor 
du Pont, “scion to another major state industry, heard from Chase Manhattan 
executives that if he combined Delaware’s existing business-friendly 
incorporation rules with loosened financial regulations, banks would swarm 
into the state.”74  Essentially, Chase Manhattan requested and received from 
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Delaware the same deal that Citibank had received in South Dakota.75  
Reasoning that “Delaware was much closer to New York compared with 
South Dakota,” and that “several major banks were already incorporated 
there because of the state’s Chancery Court,”76 Delaware developed an 
ambitious plan, building directly on the corporate platform to become, in 
then-Governor du Pont’s words, “the Luxembourg of the United States.”77  It 
would not take long to generate results, as a “dozen companies . . . opened 
offices in Delaware in the first year alone.”78  By the late 1990s, “four of the 
five largest credit card firms in the country had set up in Wilmington, and the 
industry employed at least 35,000 people.”79  MBNA, in particular, would 
come to represent a major force in Delaware’s economy and politics,80 
ultimately becoming Delaware’s largest private employer and a major source 
of campaign contributions prior to its acquisition by Bank of America in 
2006.81 
The Financial Center Development Act of 1981, which largely 
“deregulated Delaware laws governing bank-issued credit cards,”82 permitted 
banks to set up credit card operations in Delaware if they undertook to 
employ at least 100 people.83  Today, while Delaware has a general usury 
limit of 5% above the Federal Reserve discount rate,84 this limit expressly 
does not apply to credit cards issued by Delaware banks85—for which there 
is no limit on interest rates or fees.86  Meanwhile, Delaware’s position 
remains strong.  As of 2018, about 48,000 Delaware residents were employed 
in financial services,87 and the preexisting corporate platform remains a 
significant element of the larger financial services strategy.  “Even after 
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federal laws restricting interstate banking were repealed in 1994, Delaware 
remained a credit card industry stronghold because of its low tax rate for 
banks and [its] Chancery Court,”88 suggesting that the same suite of 
characteristics and strategies that positioned Delaware to thrive in financial 
services has also tended to cement its status in this related field as national 
regulatory conditions have evolved.  Other competitors with accommodating 
banking regimes do, however, remain strong as well—including South 
Dakota,89 which, as discussed above, has worked hard to preserve and build 
upon its first-mover advantage. 
2. Captive Insurance 
In much the same way that Delaware followed the lead of South Dakota 
to build upon its preexisting strengths in the related field of financial services, 
Delaware followed the lead of another state to leverage corporate law in the 
related field of insurance—in this case, Vermont.  Delaware’s competition to 
attract captive insurance business represents another extension of Delaware’s 
fundamental advantage in corporate law.  In this marketplace, however, 
Delaware faces more substantial competition from both domestic and foreign 
jurisdictions. 
Captive insurance is essentially a sophisticated form of self-insurance 
accomplished through a subsidiary formally organized as an insurance 
entity.90  A range of structures are available to self-insure individual entities 
or groups.91  Although tax abuses remain a constant concern (stemming from 
rules permitting deduction of premium payments), captive insurance is 
nevertheless widely regarded as a critical risk management tool—particularly 
in areas such as healthcare, where insurance markets remain underdeveloped, 
rendering coverage expensive or impossible to obtain.92 
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Relative to the market for credit card-issuing bank charters, the market 
for captive insurance domiciling differs in two critical respects: first, it is 
global in nature, and second, it is more competitive.  The perennial leaders in 
the captive insurance market are (in order) Bermuda, the Cayman Islands, 
and Vermont—two British Overseas Territories and a U.S. state.93  These 
three jurisdictions remain at the top of the table of the largest captive 
insurance domiciles, followed by Utah, Delaware, Guernsey, Barbados, 
Anguilla, Hawaii, and North Carolina.94  As this list conveys, sub-sovereign 
jurisdictions predominate both globally and within the United States.95  It also 
makes clear that Delaware—although certainly among the top domiciles—
does not remotely dominate the field, either internationally or domestically. 
Here, again, Delaware followed earlier movers.  Bermuda entered the 
field first in the 1960s, followed by the Cayman Islands in the 1970s, and 
Vermont—the first U.S. domicile—in the 1980s.96  As it was for Delaware 
and South Dakota, pursuit of cross-border corporate and financial services 
business was, for Vermont, an economic development imperative.  Indeed, 
Vermont reflects many of the characteristics and strategies associated with 
MDSJs above.97  Being a small state with limited economic development 
options,98 Vermont nevertheless benefits from the ease of coordination that a 
limited number of more proximate public and private actors provides—
facilitating “a nimble regulatory environment” and ensuring better “[a]ccess 
to government officials” in service-based industries including captive 
insurance.99  In these and other ways, Vermont has actively developed and 
promoted a “strong business environment.”100 
When Vermont struck upon captive insurance as a potential field of 
specialization, “the Vermont legislature responded with laws that provided 
predictability and a fair regulatory environment,” as their “Comprehensive 
Economic Development Strategy” recounts.101  Over time, “expertise for 
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forming and managing captives became centered in Vermont and the state 
maintains its competitive advantage with responsive legislation, clear 
regulation and a knowledge base to keep new captives locating in the 
state.”102  Accordingly, the “mission” of Vermont’s Captive Insurance 
Division “is to maintain a regulatory system that attracts quality business to 
Vermont, promotes our reputation in the industry, and ensures the solvency 
of captive insurers while recognizing the special purpose for which they were 
created,”103 a formulation that reflects Vermont’s pursuit of economic 
development through simultaneous regulation of and appeal to a mobile 
marketplace.  Along these lines, the Division pursues its mission by 
“[a]ttracting and licensing quality programs”; undertaking surveillance, 
examinations, and enforcement; and developing policies and procedures that 
are at once “effective and reasonable,” toward the goal of “[a]dvancing the 
growth of Vermont’s captive industry.”104 
These efforts have, to date, been quite successful.  The state touts “the 
largest network of experienced and knowledgeable regulators, management 
professionals, in-house examiners, and service providers of any domicile,” 
with “unparalleled legislative support,” in addition to an “extensive network 
of captive management firms and service providers” and “the world’s largest 
captive insurance trade association, the Vermont Captive Insurance 
Association.”105  As of year-end 2019, Vermont had 1,159 licensed captives 
with $194 billion in assets under management.106  The State collects over $25 
million annually in taxes and fees, and captives support over 400 direct jobs, 
in addition to providing indirect benefits—including “increased tourism 
spend from board meetings” and, more generally, “improved visibility and 
reputation in the business world.”107  Along these lines, the State’s economic 
development strategy includes not only capitalizing on growth in this market, 
but building on these strengths to expand into financial services as well.108  
Overall, Vermont seeks to become “the ‘Delaware’ of insurance,” at least in 
the market for captive insurance domiciling,109 where parties are free to opt 
into the legal system they prefer in much the same way that the markets for 
corporate charters and credit card-issuing bank charters permit. 
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Naturally, Delaware would prefer to be the Delaware of insurance.  So, 
it is unsurprising that Delaware, once again, followed another state’s lead and 
expanded into this new field by building upon its preexisting advantage in 
corporate law and business organizations generally.  In this area, Delaware 
was a relative latecomer, having begun to pursue captive insurance business 
only in 2005 when the General Assembly “moderniz[ed] Delaware law 
regarding the formation of these companies” with the aim of “positioning 
Delaware to become a home to the growing number of captive insurance 
companies being created by companies worldwide.”110  The legislative policy 
could not have been clearer, as the statute itself expressly states that  “It is 
determined and declared as a matter of legislative finding that captive 
insurance companies can serve a valuable risk management function, and that 
their responsible utilization and the growth of the captive insurance industry 
in the State of Delaware are in the best interests of this State.”111  The 
provision adds that “the purpose and policy of this chapter” includes 
regulation of captive insurance entities, “provid[ing] flexibility and 
opportunity” to the market, and “foster[ing] economic development in this 
State through the growth of the captive insurance industry.”112 
In marketing their offerings, the Delaware Department of Insurance 
(“DDI”) expressly roots their value proposition as a captive insurance 
domicile in their “sophisticated corporate laws, judiciary and financial 
infrastructure”—in other words, the preexisting corporate law platform 
discussed above, making Delaware “the preeminent jurisdiction for business” 
generally—and emphasizes that “[t]hese benefits are extended to [captive 
insurance] companies through the Delaware Captive Insurance Program.”113  
The Delaware Captive Insurance Association (“DCIA”) likewise touts what 
they call the “Delaware Advantage,” reflecting the same strategy.114  
“Delaware has traditionally been the preeminent and innovative domicile for 
U.S. businesses to incorporate,” they explain.115  “The Delaware Advantage 
is a collection of the many benefits the state of Delaware offers to traditional 
businesses.  The advantages of domiciling a captive in Delaware build on 
these advantages, creating the ideal domicile for captive business.”116  As to 
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their insurance-specific capacities, the DDI has “34 people working on 
Delaware’s Captive team,” of which “15 are financial analysts,” representing 
“the first-line regulator who communicates with the captive manager or 
owner.”117  They are also careful to convey that, while regulation remains 
robust, they contemplate a partnership with the industry.  As Steve Kinion, 
Director of the Captive Insurance Program, has expressed it, the “DCIA 
serves as the eyes and ears for the regulators because it provides valuable 
information about what is occurring in the industry.  We want to hear what 
the industry has to say.”118   
Overall, Delaware’s pursuit of captive insurance business has been 
successful.  DDI reports that “Delaware is third largest domicile for captives 
in the country and the fifth largest in the world.”119  As noted above, this 
places Delaware in the unfamiliar, and presumably uncomfortable, position 
of lagging multiple competitors both domestically (Vermont and Utah) and 
internationally (Bermuda and the Cayman Islands).120  Nevertheless, 
cultivating captive insurance business has had real impact in Delaware; one 
study found that the industry “directly and indirectly supports 2,537 
Delaware jobs, creates almost $109 million in additional income, and 
generates over $5 million for the state in tax revenue.”121 
Beyond generic marketing references to the business climate and 
associated track record, Delaware’s captive insurance regime builds on the 
corporate law platform in more direct and substantive ways.  Delaware’s 
regulatory system for captives is a licensing regime that works with 
preexisting entity forms, meaning that virtually any type of entity can be used 
to form a Delaware captive.122  Indeed, the DCIA claims that “Delaware 
provides more flexibility than any other onshore jurisdiction with respect to 
the legal form of organization that a captive insurance company may take.”123  
As is generally the case with Delaware entities, only a minimal nexus with 
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the state of Delaware is required.  While a captive must generally maintain 
“its principal place of business” and have a registered office and agent for 
service of process in Delaware, and hold in the state “at least 1 meeting each 
year” of its board or governing body, of which at least one member must be 
a Delaware resident (or have the member’s principal place of business in 
Delaware),124 there “is no requirement to retain a Delaware based captive 
manager.”125  Additionally, the statute authorizes the Insurance 
Commissioner to issue “conditional” licenses under certain circumstances, 
permitting captives to begin conducting business immediately, based on a 
“statement of compliance signed by the owner . . . stating that to the best of 
the owner’s belief the business plan and other documents filed . . . comply 
with” stated requirements126—a same-day convenience that apparently only 
Delaware offers.127  The Insurance Commissioner has additional authority, 
meanwhile, to “exempt a special purpose captive insurance company” from 
otherwise-applicable statutory requirements and regulations.128 
At the same time, Delaware government officials and industry 
representatives strongly emphasize innovations at the level of entity 
organization that purportedly offer distinctive advantages in the captive 
insurance context—a direct and substantive link with Delaware’s preexisting 
corporate platform.  In particular, the DCIA explains that only a few states 
“allow series limited liability companies [series LLCs], which are set up to 
allow one core company to segregate its risks” internally, and that Delaware 
“has taken the regulation a step further to allow series captives.”129  
Significantly, the series LLC is an innovation that arises in the first instance 
under entity laws that fall within the purview of the Division of Corporations, 
not the Department of Insurance.130  Delaware’s captive insurance statute 
expressly provides that an individual series of an LLC can, itself, be granted 
a captive license.131 
The nature of this structure is somewhat abstract, and the differences 
from competing structures are subtle, but the resulting advantages are 
 
 124. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, §§ 6903(b)(2)–(4), 6906(f).  More lenient rules may apply in 
certain contexts, notably for “branch” captives organized elsewhere and licensed to conduct 
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 127. See Holmes, supra note 116.   
 128. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, §§ 6915, 6915A.  
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2017, at 38, 38–39.  
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potentially significant.  Relative to the individual cells of so-called protected 
cell companies (“PCCs”), first developed in Guernsey, the individual series 
of so-called series LLCs, first developed in Delaware, possess attributes more 
closely akin to distinct legal entities in their own right.132  Notably, a cell 
cannot contract, sue, or be sued in its own name, whereas a series can.133  
Delaware’s LLC Act expressly provides that a series of a Delaware LLC can 
have its own assets and liabilities, enter contracts, and sue and be sued;134 
have its own distinct governance structure;135 and be independently 
terminated and wound up.136  Advantages of this structure include tax, 
governance, and administrative efficiencies,137 and the entity-like features 
that series exhibit are thought to increase the likelihood that the desired 
segregation of assets and liabilities will be respected by courts.138  
Accordingly, “while Delaware also permitted the use of PCCs, it did not take 
long before Series LLCs became the favored ‘serial’ structure in 
Delaware.”139  Since the first series LLC license was granted in 2010, “dozens 
of Series LLC structures, with hundreds of individual series, have been 
formed in Delaware.”140  While, as discussed above, Delaware is not the 
market leader in captive insurance (internationally or domestically), other 
states “have taken note of the success of the Delaware Series LLC” and 
adapted accordingly.141  This underscores that Delaware’s preexisting 
corporate platform and the capacities it reflects do in fact provide substantive 
competitive benefits in this related field—even if work remains to be done 
for Delaware to catch up with the overall market leaders. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In assessing Delaware’s competitive position vis-à-vis other 
jurisdictions, much turns on the frame of reference.  As the foregoing 
discussion demonstrates, while Delaware’s historical achievements and 
contemporary advantages in the domestic competition for corporate charters 
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 137. See The Delaware Advantage, supra note 114; Simpson & Rennick, supra note 129, at 38. 
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are indeed impressive—and while it remains difficult to imagine a credible 
domestic threat in this context (short of outright federal preemption with 
respect to public companies, which remains unlikely)—Delaware’s position 
differs when one looks beyond corporate charters, and beyond domestic 
competitors. 
Driven largely by economic development imperatives that are well 
familiar to smaller jurisdictions around the world, and with the prudent aim 
of diversifying state revenues, Delaware has endeavored to leverage its 
preexisting corporate law platform in distinct though related fields where 
businesses similarly have choices to make about the governing law, and 
where chartering dynamics and entity structures similarly loom large. 
This broader framing complicates prevailing accounts of Delaware’s 
competitive landscape and future prospects.  Even when the inquiry remains 
focused on corporate chartering, prevailing accounts fail to address global 
competition, which threatens to erode Delaware’s position both domestically 
and abroad.  At the same time, expanding the frame of reference to include 
additional fields of competition opens a new perspective on Delaware’s 
motivations and competitive position in multiple respects.  Notably, it reflects 
an underlying economic development imperative to branch out beyond 
corporate law; it reveals that, in certain markets, Delaware occupies the less 
familiar, and perhaps uncomfortable, posture of being a follower rather than 
a market leader; and it illuminates a larger and more complex competitive 
landscape for cross-border corporate and financial services where Delaware 
does indeed face meaningful competition, both from other states and from 
foreign jurisdictions. 
Delaware’s long-term prospects may substantially turn on how 
effectively the state navigates this broader competitive landscape.  This, in 
turn, requires a reconceptualization of the relevant marketplace—one that is 
more embracing and multi-faceted than prevailing accounts contemplate. 
